With the declassification and release Saturday night of the “President’s Daily Brief” from August 6, 2001, the Bush administration has sought to stave off rising criticism that they could have acted to prevent the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
This unprecedented peek at a top secret document prepared by the CIA for President Bush’s eyes only was in response to tough questioning faced by National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice during testimony Thursday before the bipartisan commission investigating the attacks, wherein Rice claimed that any knowledge of an al-Qaeda threat was “historical” in nature, and that the White House had little reason to suspect an attack inside the United States.
As Rice maintained, and the document corroborates, intelligence information at that time did not specifically indicate where, when or how an attack might take place, but spoke in general terms. Nevertheless questions raised before the Rice testimony as to what the President knew, when he knew it, what he did in response and whether he could have done more, remain.
While the PDB may not have provided the “silver bullet” Rice suggested was needed to stop the terrorist acts in New York and Washington, it does suggest US intelligence was monitoring activities and aware of plans against this country dating back to 1998. 
The report states: “After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, [Usama] Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a [classified intelligence] service.”
“Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance…”
We now know the 9/11 hijackers were in this country for at least a year prior, training as pilots and living quietly in communities around the country. The document goes on, “Al-Qa’ida members–including some who are US citizens–have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks” adding, “A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.”
The page and a quarter briefing paper concludes with the most shocking evidence in light of what we now know: “We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting such as that from a [classified intelligence] service in 1998 saying Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Shaykh” ‘Umar’ Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.
Al-Rahman was the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
“Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.”
In his book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke, former anti-terrorism czar under President’s Clinton and Bush, claims the Clinton administration was taking foreign terrorist threats seriously by 1994. Yet Clarke says after the 2000 election, he made numerous attempts to meet with Bush to discuss terrorism but was unable to get a meeting until just a week before 9/11. He had been able to meet however with Rice, Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
The opportunity for the White House to act was there, even without specific threats. It was well known that the nation’s air transportation system was a sitting target. Low-wage, contracted airport security screeners, federalized after the fact, were the weakest link. Better background checks on baggage handlers and airline staff with access to planes could have been undertaken. After 9/11, security checks found box cutters like those used during the hijackings, stashed away on other grounded aircraft.
The federal air marshall service was a program on the brink of elimination prior to 9/11. Warnings of possible hijackings should have called for a reevaluation of those plans. Again, that all happened after the fact.
The biggest step President Bush should have taken was to cause the FBI and CIA to share information better. Those two agencies have a long history of infighting, and openly debated whether terrorism was a law enforcement or an intelligence matter. Guidance from the National Security Advisor should have clarified that.
Whether 9/11 could have been prevented will continue to be the subject of debate. However an easier case can be made against the invasion of Iraq. As Clarke says in his book, the Bush administration immediately began planning an attack against Saddam Hussein despite intelligence reports that Iraq was unconnected to the bombings.
Now yet another book critical of White House handling of the situation, Disarming Iraq, by former United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix, likens the search for weapons of mass destruction to a witch hunt. Armed with no hard evidence of their existence or whereabouts, Washington continued to assert they were there. Calls for more time to inspect were ignored, opportunities to employ diplomacy and broad international support were lost, a war was started, and a year later it is escalating with no end in sight.
What did President Bush know about 9/11 and when did he know it? What did they do to prevent it? What have they done in response? How effective has that response been? With no WMD or a connection to 9/11, why was Iraq even invaded? When will there be stability and peace there? At what cost? What happened to the search for Usama bin Laden? Has al-Qaeda been weakened or strengthened? Are there now new terrorist threats in addition to al-Qaeda? Is the world a safer place?
Questions, but few clear answers.